The Human Rights Act 1998 and Parliamentary Sovereignty Essay

The sympathetic Rights figure out 1998 and Parliamentary Sovereignty - Essay ExampleAlthough Section 3(1) of the human Rights Act 1998 provides for a limit point on the courts power, in exercising it appears as though it is the courts rather than Parliament that at long last determines the extent to which human rights can be enforced and protected. 1 Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that courts ar required to interpret national legislation in such a way as to stop up that they are self-consistent with human rights beneath the European conventionalism on Human Rights.2 However, in practice Parliament seemingly ceded parliamentary sovereignty relative to convention rights to the judiciary. As Young notes, Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 could have the same effect as if it impliedly repealed the provisions of all statutes that are inconsistent with Convention rights.3 Some members of the judiciary have expressed concerns over how the judiciarys en hanced role under the Human Rights Act 1998 can be applied in a manner that corresponds with Parliamentary sovereignty.4 Goldsworthy however, argues that concerns nigh the Human Rights Act 1998 usurping Parliamentary sovereignty and introducing juridical sovereignty are unfounded. The Human Rights Act 1998 does jaw unprecedented authority upon the judiciary in terms of interpreting statutes so as to render them consistent with Convention rights. At the same time, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide the judiciary with the authority to disapply or invalidate those statutes.... Lord Hope observed that The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate arrogant factor on which our constitution is based.10 Therefore from Lord Hopes perspective, Parliamentary sovereignty has evolved with the execution of instrument of the Human Rights Act 1998 and has not altered the UKs constituent(a) principles and values. Lord Steyn, however alludes to a double sovereignty shared by t he judiciary and Parliament as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998.11 Keene argues that the Judiciary under the deference principles implicit in the Human Rights Act 1998, attempts to strike a modal(a) balance between individual rights and the need to respect Parliaments proper function.12 This rapprochement act can be observed in the judgment of Laws LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department. In this case Laws LJ set fourth four guiding principles for judicial application and interpretation of Convention rights under the authority permitted by the Human Rights Act. To begin with, the courts must open deference to Acts of Parliament rather than to executive or other official decisions and measures. Secondly, there will be no deference in instances when the Convention calls for a fair balance or where the rights under the Convention are absolute. Thirdly, where parliament will be given deference in instances where the manner is within th eir constitutional prevue and less deference will be given when the matter is within the judiciarys constitutional prevue. Finally Greater or less deference will be due match to whether the subject matter lies more readily within the actual or potential expertise of the popular powers or the