Iraq or its capital of Baghdad was not accustomed to “freedom”

For, in truth, there is no sure way of attri exclusivelye other than by laying, and whoever be arrives master of a City accustomed to deplete sex in freedom and does non destroy it, may reckon on being finished by it (Machiavelli 11). Hence we may learn the lesson that on seizing a state, the usurper should make haste to inflict what injuries he must, at a stroke, that he may not have to rectify them daily, but be able by their discontinuation to reassure mens minds, and by and bywards win them over by benefits (23).While it empennage hardly be argued that Iraq or its capital of Baghdad, which reflects the divisions of Iraq, was accustomed to freedom ahead the American invasion, it at least enjoyed freedom from foreign occupation. The above retell is relevant to the American experience in Iraq because, pursuant to the failure to destroy the enemy in the opening stages of the war, the American mission is in skillful risk of being destroyed by that very enemy, years after taking nominal control over Iraq.A failure to stay restive Sunni centers such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul during or immediately after the initial invasion, a failure to destroy in Machiavellis parlance, left the American occupation armies among its enemies rather than victorious over them. This negligence, and the go awayingness to bypass centers of resistance on the drive to Baghdad rather than to subdue them, led directly to the undermentioned stage of failure, and the next piece of relevant advice from The Prince.If, however, the unfermentedly acquired City or Province has been accustomed to live under a Prince, and his line is extinguished, it depart be impossible for the citizens, used, on the one hand, to obey, and disadvantaged, on the other, of their old find outr, to take for to choose a leader from among themselves (11-12).The Prince in this scenario, of course, is Saddam ibn Talal Hussein Husseins line was some(prenominal) biological, in the work on of his so ns Uday and Qusay, and political, in the form of the brutal and brilliantly organized Baath Party. The United States willingly destroyed the heart, brain, and nerve center of the Iraki state and came with no workable contrive to replace them. It should hardly have come as any surprise, bearing all of this in mind, that the Iraqi hoi polloi have been unable to come to any sort of consensus on what form their new government should take. The undefiled gamble of the Iraq War, from the perspective of the Bush administration, hinged on the hope that Machiavelli was wrong, the hope that citizens deprived of a powerful prince would be able to peaceably choose a new leader from among themselves.A further failure of the American effort in Iraq has been the inability to instill a sense of loyalty for the new Iraqi government and regular army among a critical mass of the Iraqi people. Loyalty should not be taken to imply affection, but b arly respect and deference. Employing historicall y brutal methods, Saddam Hussein garnered a certain(a) sense of loyalty from the Iraqi people. The new Iraq government, however, is not recognized by near Iraqis as the legitimate or competent representation of the Iraqi state instead, a slew of militias and insurgent groups command far more than loyalty on the street than do the national cornerstones sponsored and supported by the United States.The first rule of any government, democratic or not, is the rule of one gun. In other words, the state must be perceived to be the only legitimate employer of violence. That is most decidedly not the case in post-invasion Iraq. As Machiavelli wrote, a wise Prince should devise federal agency whereby his subjects may at all times, whether favourable or adverse, feel the deficiency of the State and of him, and then they will always be faithful to him (26).The genuineness and the staying power of the Iraqi government is the most important factor of the American mission in Iraq, since the yield of an openly anti-American government would throw out any theoretical benefit from the original invasion. The trouble is that a self-perpetuating speech rhythm is at work the Iraqi government likely cannot survive without American military protection, yet that very protection ensures that the Iraqi government will never be genuinely legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. Mercenaries and auxiliaries ar at once useless and dangerous, and he who holds his State by government agency of mercenary troops can never be solidly or securely seated (31).In a opinery as dual-lane by clan and ethnicity and religious sect as Iraq is, an invading army must have a solid appraisal of what groups it must count as allies in order to effectively govern the country. some(prenominal) of the decisions taken by the American proconsul, Jerry Bremer, imply that this appraisal was either never made or was horribly blundered. Two such decisions come to mind. Firstly, the Iraqi army was disbande d and its soldiers and military officers were sent home without any way of supporting their families but with their weapons. Secondly, the Baath Party was dissolved, and a massive pro office of its members were excluded from meaningful company in the new Iraq.Due to the nature of the Iraqi military, especially its officer corps, and the Baath party, these decisions effectively made enemies of the Sunni minority in Iraq, which included the most militarily competent, technocratic, educated, secular, and Western-oriented elements of the society. The very Iraqis, in other words, who could bring either the sterling(prenominal) harm or the greatest aid to the American occupation. As Princes cannot execute being hated by some, they should, in the first place, endeavor not to be hated by a distinguish failing in which, they must do all they can to escape the plague of that class which is the stronger (51).After dismissing the Iraqi army, and thereby humiliating a large portion of the population, it became evident that the American occupation could never succeed without an Iraqi army, as there were not nearly enough American soldiers to pacify Iraq. The Americans thence began training and arming a new Iraqi army, but the disparage had been done. By dismissing the nearest thing to a truly national institution in Baathist Iraq, the Americans proved their distrust of the Iraqi people. It was therefore undeniable that the new, American-backed Iraqi army would be tainted as occupation collaborators by the population and occasionally as insurgent collaborators by the Americans.Most experts instanter point to the decision to disband the Iraqi army without pay and with weapons was the undivided biggest blunder that the United States made in Iraq. This single decision promptly created a vast class of humiliated, impoverished, idle, and armed young men, which essentially guaranteed the emergence of an insurgency. By disarming, you at once giver offence, since you sh ow your subjects that you distrust them, either as doubting their courage, or as doubting their fidelity, each of which imputations begets hatred against you (56).It seems unreal now, but it is important to note that there was no insurgency in the early months of the American occupation it seems now that the Iraqi people were giving the Americans a chance to make clear their true motives and intentions. wizard wonders what may have happened had the Iraqi army been called upon by the American army to join together in rebuilding and securing Iraq, a goal that both groups shared. One wonders what may have happened had thousands of mid-level Baathist technocrats been allowed to keep their jobs, such as running electrical grids, hospitals, and water purification plants. One wonders indeed.The above quotes and examples are all variations of one unifying theme the American errors in Iraq have been driven by a failure to recognize its natural allies, to send away the emergence of natural enemies, and to win the trust and loyalty of the local population. apiece of these necessities was articulated in The Prince, and one wonders if George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld ever read the book. plant life CitedMachiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. New York Dover Publications, Inc., 1992.